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Potentially Reduced Exposure Cigarettes: The Need 
for a Public Health Policy 
Christopher N. Banthin∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 26, 2005, Vermont Attorney General, William 
Sorrell, announced that his office had filed a lawsuit against R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Company for using false and misleading 
advertising in the promotion of Eclipse cigarettes.1  R.J. 
Reynolds claimed that smoking Eclipse cigarettes may be less 
harmful than smoking traditional cigarettes.2  Several years 
earlier, in late 2000, Eclipse cigarettes were the subject of a 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health investigation that 
found virtually no difference between the smoke emitted by 
Eclipse cigarettes and that of several other conventional 
cigarette brands.3  Indeed, Eclipse smoke contained even higher 
levels of certain toxic constituents, according to the study.4  The 
findings attracted the attention of a group of state attorneys 
      ©   2007 Christopher N. Banthin. 
       ∗    Director, Tobacco Control Resource Center, Public Health Advocacy 
Institute, Inc., Northeastern University School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts.  
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School of Public Health. 
 1. See Press Release, Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell, Attorney 
General William H. Sorrell Sues R.J. Reynolds For Consumer Fraud and 
Violation of Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (July 26, 2005), available at 
http://www.atg.state.vt.us/display.php?pubsec=4&curdoc=970. 
 2. See R.J. Reynolds, How Eclipse Works, 
http://www.eclipse.rjrt.com/ECL/story3.jsp (last visited Jan. 26, 2007). 
 3. See Letter from Howard Koh, Commissioner, Massachusetts 
Department of Public Health, to Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Federal Trade 
Commission (Oct. 3, 2000), available at 
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/reports/eclipse/maletter.pdf. 
 4. See id. 
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general who asked R.J. Reynolds for the scientific data 
supporting its claims.5  Their conclusion: R.J. Reynolds had no 
“competent and reliable scientific evidence to substantiate such 
representations.”6 
R.J. Reynolds is not the only cigarette manufacturer 
claiming to have risk-reduction technology.  Nearly the entire 
domestic cigarette industry is radically, and in a public fashion, 
shifting much of its business in this direction.7  Industry 
research and development in this area climbed 40% from 1999 to 
2004.8  Sales are expected to account for 3% of U.S. industry 
sales volume in cigarettes, or $1 billion in sales, by 2009.9  By 
2015, financial analysts expect sales to exceed $20 billion and 
comprise 44% of the current U.S. industry sales volume.10  
Other companies are following this trend by introducing “less 
risky” tobacco products, such as ExaltTM and Revel® tobacco 
chew packets,11 Ariva® tobacco lozenges, and Stonewall Hard 
Snuff®.12  Collectively, these so-called “reduced risk” tobacco 
products are referred to as Potentially Reduced Exposure 
Products (PREPs).13 This article focuses on the cigarette 
gory of PREPs. 
The tobacco industry may be counting on its multi-billion 
dollar investment in PREPs not only to produce a potentially 
less risky tobacco product, but more importantly to build 
 5. See Tom Precious, Cigarette Claiming Reduced Risks to Health is 
Probed by Spitzer, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 13, 2004, at A8. 
 6. Petition for Contempt & Complaint at 5, Vermont v. R.J. Reynolds 




 7. See Martin Steinik & Michael Smith, The Path to a Safer Cigarette, J P 
Morgan Global Equity Research (July 26, 2004) (on file with author). 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See Revel®, http://www.revel.com (last visited Jan. 26, 2006); see also 
Press Release, Swedish Match,  Swedish Match Announces Test Market of 
ExaltTM – an Alternative for Smokers (April 27, 2001), available at 
http://nweb.waymaker.se/bitonline/2001/04/27/20010427BIT00770/bit0001.pdf. 
 12. See Press Release, Star Scientific, Inc., Star Scientific Statement on 
Ariva® and Stonewall Hard Snuff®, Tobacco Products for the Twenty-First 
Century (May 4, 2006), available at http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=105863&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=852475&highlight. 
 13. See A. B. Breland et al., Acute effects of Advance™: a Potential Exposure 
Product for Smokers, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL 376, 376-378 (2002). 
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capacity for the idea that at least some types of tobacco use are 
deemed acceptable.  Tobacco use is the single most preventable 
cause of death in the United States, killing 400,000 Americans 
every year.14  Tobacco-related mortality is higher than that 
caused by alcohol, AIDS, automobile collisions, illegal drugs, 
murders, and suicides combined.15  Millions more suffer adverse 
health ef
ke.16 
This article examines the cigarette industry’s interest in 
harm reduction, and ultimately recommends the need for a 
responsive legal policy.  Part II examines some of the new PREP 
cigarettes as well as the research and technology that led to 
their development.  Part III discusses the manner in which the 
cigarette industry behaved in the absence of product regulation 
of cigarettes.  Part IV takes a closer look at the Eclipse cigarette 
lawsuit and potential problems that may be beyond the reach of 
such legal remedies.  Part V recommends regulatory policies for 
PREP
II. HARM REDUCTION CLAIMS AND TECHNOLOGY 
Tobacco smoke might best be described as a toxic brew that 
contains acetone, ammonia, arsenic, benzene, cadmium, carbon 
monoxide, formaldehyde, hydrogen cyanide, lead, toluene and 
more. 17  Each puff of smoke contains more than fifty known or 
probable carcinogens.18  Consequently, the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency classifies tobacco smoke as a Group A 
carcinogen.19  The 2004 U.S. Surgeon General’s Report 
 14. See Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Annual Smoking-
Attributable Mortality, Years of Potential Life Lost, and Economic Costs – 
United States, 1995-1999, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 297, 300 
(2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5114.pdf. 
 15. See Eric Lindblom & Katie McMahon, Toll of Tobacco in the United 
States of America, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, Jan. 4, 2007, available 
at http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0072.pdf. 
 16. See FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., THE PRICE OF SMOKING 197-244 (MIT 
Press 2004). 
 17. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 1986 SURGEON 
GENERAL REPORT: THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING 
225-52 (1986), available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/sgr_1986/index.htm. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/600/6-90/006F, RESPIRATORY 
HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS 
5-63 to -68 (1993). 
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the body,20 and the 2006 U.S. Surgeon General’s Report stated 
that there is no known safe level of smoking or exposure to 
secondhand smoke.21 
PREP technology allegedly works by reducing the emission 
of carcinogens in cigarette smoke.22  One proposed way to do this 
is to avoid combustion, which creates some of the carcinogens 
found in tobacco smoke.23  R.J. Reynolds uses this method in its 
Eclipse cigarettes.  Eclipse creates a smoke-like vapor by 
heating tobacco without burning it in a process analogous to 
cooking a meal in an oven at a temperature that will not burn 
it.24  Using a match or lighter, the smoker ignites a miniature 
heating element embedded in the tip of each Eclipse cigarette.25  
The smoker draws on Eclipse just like a conventional cigarette 
and the heating element super heats air before it is drawn 
through the tobacco and into the smoker’s lungs.26  The heating 
element and tobacco are wrapped in paper and aluminum foil.27  
There is no filter.28 
Accord cigarettes, produced by Philip Morris, similarly 
involve heating tobacco, but the smoker inserts the Accord 
cigarette into a small, battery-powered heating device about the 
size of a small mobile phone.29  When the smoker draws on the 
cigarette, the heating device automatically delivers a specific 
amount of tobacco vapor into the smoker’s lungs.30  A screen on 
the device shows the smoker how many puffs remain in the 
cigarette.31 
 20. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., New 
Surgeon General's Report Expands List of Diseases Caused by Smoking (May 
27, 2004), available at  
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2004pres/20040527a.html. 
 21. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., New 
Surgeon General’s Report Focuses on the Effects of Secondhand Smoke (June 
27, 2006), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2006pres/20060627.html. 
 22. See J. Slade et al., Eclipse: Does It Live Up to its Health Claims?, 11 
TOBACCO CONTROL ii64, ii64-ii70 (2002). 
 23. See id. 
 24. R.J. Reynolds, supra note 2. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See Lexi Krock, Anatomy of a Cigarette, NOVA ONLINE, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/cigarette/anatomy.html (updated Oct. 21, 2006). 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
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Another technique for reducing carcinogenic emissions from 
cigarettes is to change the tobacco curing process,32 which can be 
altered to reduce a group of carcinogens called tobacco specific 
nitrosamines (TSNAs).33  For example, using direct-fire burners 
in tobacco barns during the curing process causes high levels of 
TSNAs.34  Eliminating direct-fire burners may reduce levels of 
TSNAs.35  Brown and Williamson claims that its AdvanceTM 
cigarette has “less of the toxins” in part because of such a 
patented curing process that inhibits the formation of TSNAs.36 
Chemical additives are also used in the attempt to reduce 
carcinogenic emissions from cigarettes.  Omni cigarettes, 
produced by Vector Tobacco, use palladium, a rare metal, as a 
burning catalyst to reduce levels of polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons (PAHs) as well as TSNAs.37  PAHs are a potent 
group of carcinogens that form during the combustion process.38  
Palladium increases the efficiency of combustion when a 
cigarette is lit and smoked, which leads to a more complete 
burning of the tobacco and theoretically reduces the emissions of 
certain carcinogens like PAHs and TSNAs.39 
It is also possible for manufacturers to genetically modify 
tobacco, a process which Vector Tobacco uses in making its 
reduced-nicotine cigarette called Quest®.40  Quest® comes in 
three varieties: “Low Nicotine,” “Extra Low Nicotine,” and 
“Nicotine-Free.”41  Users are invited to move in steps to 
 32. See N. Gray & P. Boyle, The Case of the Disappearing Nitrosamines: A 
Potentially Global Phenomenon, 13 TOBACCO CONTROL 13, 13 (2004). 
 33. See id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See A. B. Breland et al., Tobacco Specific Nitrosamines and Potential 
Reduced Exposure Products for Smokers: A Preliminary Evaluation of 
Advance™, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL 317, 317 (2003). 
 37. See JEFF FOWLES, NOVEL TOBACCO PRODUCTS: HEALTH RISK 
IMPLICATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS 13 (2001), available at 
http://www.ndp.govt.nz/publications/noveltobaccoproductsreport.pdf. 
 38. See DOROTHY HATSUKAMI & STEPHEN HECHT, HOPE OR HAZARD? WHAT 
RESEARCH TELLS US ABOUT “POTENTIALLY REDUCED-EXPOSURE” TOBACCO 
PRODUCTS 6 (2005), available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/Hope%20or%20Hazard.pdf. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See J. Dunsby & L. Bero, A Nicotine Delivery Device Without the 
Nicotine? Tobacco Industry Development of Low Nicotine Cigarettes, 13 
TOBACCO CONTROL 362, 367 (2004). 
 41. Welcome to the World of Quest!, http://www.questcigs.com (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2007). 
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“nicotine-free smoking.”42  In the late 1980s, Philip Morris 
briefly offered a nicotine-free cigarette called Next by adapting 
the method used to remove caffeine from coffee to remove 
nicotine from tobacco.43 
One of the most highly watched PREP brands is expected to 
be based on Philip Morris’ very popular flagship brand Marlboro, 
and will be called Marlboro Ultra Smooth. 44  The product was 
recently test marketed in three cities.45  Marlboro Ultra Smooth 
uses highly activated carbon in its filter.46  The activated carbon 
captures some carcinogenic constituents as the smoke is drawn 
through the filter.47  The technology has been shown to reduce 
emissions of butadiene, acetaldehyde, acrolein, benzene, 
acrylonitrile and other carcinogens in cigarette smoke.48 
Despite the tobacco industry’s research and development, at 
this point, there are no reliable predictions or assessments of the 
risks involved in using these products or whether they are less 
harmful than traditional cigarettes.49  At the outset, it is 
important to understand that the measurement of levels of 
constituents in smoke is not an accurate gauge of actual 
exposure levels.50  The design and composition of each cigarette 
brand affects the manner in which smokers smoke, and 
therefore, their exposure levels. 51  Differences in how a smoker 
holds a cigarette, the frequency and depth of each puff of smoke, 
the length of time each puff of smoke is held in the lungs, and 
many other factors must all be accounted for in order to 
 42. See id. 
 43. See Dunsby & Bero, supra note 40, at 363-64. 
 44. See Press Release, Altria Group, Inc., Remarks by David R. Beran 
Executive Vice President Finance, Planning and Information Philip Morris USA 
Inc.: Prudential Back-to-School Conference (Sept. 7, 2005), available at 
http://www.altria.com/media/press_release/03_02_pr_2005_09_07_02.asp#. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Murray Laugesen & Jefferson Fowles, Marlboro Ultrasmooth: a 
Potential Reduced Exposure Cigarette?, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL 430, 430-31 
(2006). 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See COMM. TO ASSESS THE SCI. BASE FOR TOBACCO HARM REDUCTION, 
INST. OF MEDICINE, CLEARING THE SMOKE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE FOR 
TOBACCO HARM REDUCTION vii-ix (Kathleen Stratton et al., eds. 2001); see also 
Dorothy K. Hatsukami et al., Methods to Assess Potential Reduced Exposure 
Products, 7 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RESEARCH 827, 827 (2005). 
 50. See COMM. TO ASSESS THE SCI. BASE FOR TOBACCO HARM REDUCTION, 
INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 49, at 210. 
 51. See id. 
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determine actual exposure levels.52 
Even if evaluators could account for differences in smoking 
behavior and identify the actual exposure levels by brand, 
further research would be needed to predict comprehensively 
changes in health effects from smoking.53  Current technology is 
unable to accurately map the relationship between exposure to 
tobacco smoke and the tobacco-related diseases at levels 
necessary to detect whether reduction in exposure would 
correspond to a meaningful reduction in harmful effects.54  For 
certain carcinogens a 50% reduction in exposure might yield an 
immense health benefit, yet for others it might have no effect at 
all. 
A promising approach for assessing the health effects of 
PREP technology, according to Hatsukami and colleagues, is the 
use of biomarkers.55  Biomarkers are measurable conditions in 
the body that correlate to one or more aspects of the course of a 
disease.56  Examples of a measurable condition might include 
chemical levels, measures of tissue inflammation, or changes in 
tissue structure.57  Hatsukami and colleagues identified several 
biomarkers linked to diseases common in smokers and looked at 
the feasibility of measuring each of these biomarkers.58  They 
measured differences in the biomarkers among smokers and 
nonsmokers, looked at changes in biomarkers after smoking 
cessation and reduced smoking, and looked at the response of 
biomarkers to different doses of tobacco smoke.59  Although 
Hatsukami and colleagues concluded that “no existing 
biomarkers have been demonstrated to be predictive of tobacco-
related disease,” they feel further research may yield effective 
protocols for evaluating PREPs.60 
It should come as no surprise that manufacturers have the 
ability to change the design and composition of cigarettes so that 
 52. See id. 
 53. See Dorothy K. Hatsukami et al., Harm Reduction Approaches to 
Reducing Tobacco-Related Mortality, 25 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 377, 381 
(2004). 
 54. See COMM. TO ASSESS THE SCI. BASE FOR TOBACCO HARM REDUCTION, 
INST. OF MEDICINE, supra note 49 at 9–11. 
 55. See Dorothy K. Hatsukami et al., Biomarkers to Assess the Utility of 
Potential Reduced Exposure Tobacco Products, 8 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 
169, 169 (2006). 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. at 169–80. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. at 169–70. 
 60. Id. at 169. 
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they emit fewer carcinogens or are less addictive.  Cigarettes are 
highly engineered products—not simply tobacco wrapped in 
paper.  Some design features that affect the function of a 
cigarette include paper porosity, tobacco rod length and density, 
tobacco rod girth, ventilation holes, filter size and length, filter 
composition, tobacco leaf type, genetic modification of tobacco 
leaves, tobacco leaf preparation, and other ingredients.  The 
critical question is whether manufacturers are willing to change 
cigarette design and composition in a manner that meaningfully 
reduces the impact of tobacco on the public’s health. 
III. THE ABSENCE OF REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 
Currently, cigarette manufacturers can legally produce 
different brands of cigarettes that pose different harmful effects 
to the health of smokers.  The health risk and lethality of 
cigarettes is completely unregulated.61  Indeed, federal law 
actually presumes that all cigarette brands are equally harmful.  
Congress mandates that the same health warnings appear on all 
cigarette packages and advertisements.62  The only disclosure 
requirement applicable to manufacturers is an annual disclosure 
listing the ingredients, which does not require the amount of 
each ingredient or contain any brand specific information.63 
Undoubtedly this is an unusually weak level of oversight for 
a product that contributes to the death of more than 400,000 
Americans every year.64  Yet in 2000 a closely divided U.S. 
Supreme Court, in Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., concluded that this is exactly what 
 61. See Matthew L. Meyers, Opposition in Search of a Rationale: the Case 
for Food and Drug Administration Regulation, 13 TOBACCO CONTROL 441 
(2004). 
 62. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (2000).  The current federally mandated provide 
no information on PREP brands, let alone warn against overestimating the 
benefits of PREPs.  See Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of Oct. 12, 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984).  The health warnings have not been 
updated since 1984, more than a decade before manufacturers first introduced 
PREP brands.  Id. 
 63. See Patricia Davidson, Tobacco Ingredients and Smoke Constituent 
Reporting and Disclosure Laws: The Case for Expansion, 77 DENV. U.L. REV. 1, 
3 (1999). 
 64. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Cigarette Smoking-
Attributable Morbidity – United States, 2000, 52 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WKLY. REP. 842, 842 (2003), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5235.pdf. 
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Congress intended.65  The case began after the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) determined that its authority included 
the ability to regulate cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.66  The 
FDA based its authority on findings that nicotine is a “drug” and 
that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are “drug delivery 
devices.”67  The FDA immediately promulgated regulations 
restricting sales and advertising aimed at children68 and 
foreshadowed the possibility of actual product regulation under 
its market-approval process.69  The leading cigarette 
manufacturers responded by challenging the assertion of this 
authority.70 
The Court found that the FDA’s assertion contradicted 
congressional pronouncements regarding the oversight of 
tobacco.71  The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 
and other federal statutes provided the Court with ample 
evidence that Congress, though willing to establish health 
warnings and the like, did not contemplate that tobacco products 
would be regulated as drugs or medical devices.72  Furthermore, 
the Court found that the structure of the FDA’s enabling 
legislation, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, was inconsistent 
with regulating tobacco products as drugs or medical devices 
since the FDA would be required to conclude that tobacco 
products presented “a potential unreasonable risk of illness or 
injury” under its standard market approval process and ban 
their sale.73 
 65. See Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 
U.S. 120, 120 (2000). 
 66. See Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These 
Products Are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619 (Aug. 28, 
1996); see also Analysis Regarding Food and Drug Administration’s Jurisdiction 
Over Nicotine Containing-Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products, 60 Fed. 
Reg. 41,453 (Aug. 11, 1995). 
 67. See Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These 
Products Are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional Determination, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,632-33; Analysis 
Regarding Food and Drug Administration’s Jurisdiction Over Nicotine 
Containing-Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,453. 
 68. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and 
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 
(Aug. 28, 1996). 
 69. See id. at 44,412. 
 70. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120. 
 71. See id. at 142. 
 72. See id. at 137–139. 
 73. See id. at 136 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2000)). 
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The review of tobacco-related federal legislation also showed 
that Congress had carved out very unique treatment for tobacco 
manufacturers.  Justice O’Connor stated, “Congress, for better 
or for worse, has created a distinct regulatory scheme for tobacco 
products, squarely rejected proposals to give the FDA 
jurisdiction over tobacco, and repeatedly acted to preclude any 
agency from exercising significant policymaking authority in the 
area.”74 
Congress regulates tobacco directly, giving only marginal 
oversight responsibility to federal agencies.  The Federal Trade 
Commission enforces the health warning requirements, but is 
not authorized to change the health warnings75 even though 
they have not been updated since 198476 and are widely 
considered to be inadequate.77  The Secretary of Health and 
Human Services obtains one aggregate list of cigarette 
ingredients from each manufacturer, but cannot require 
anything more specific.78  The list does not identify the amount 
of each ingredient, the ingredients contained in a particular 
brand, or even the specific ingredients used by a 
manufacturer.79  Additionally, tobacco products were specifically 
excluded from the authority of the Consumer Products Safety 
Commission and the authority of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency under the Toxic Substa
The tobacco industry has similarly avoided product 
regulation by states.  Around the same time the FDA-asserted 
authority was struck down, Massachusetts enacted the strictest 
cigarette-ingredients disclosure law in the country.81  The 
 74. Id. at 159–60. 
 75. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000) (prescribing a narrow and exhaustive list of 
mandatory warnings while granting authority to the Federal Trade Commission 
only to ensure that cigarette manufacturers comply with the warning 
requirements). 
 76. See Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of October 12, 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98–474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984). 
 77. See, e.g., D. Hammond et al., Effectiveness of Cigarette Warning Labels 
in Informing Smokers About the Risks of Smoking: Findings from the 
International Tobacco Control (ITC) Four Country Survey, 15 TOBACCO 
CONTROL iii19, iii19 (2006). 
 78. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335a(a) (2000). 
 79. See id. 
 80. See 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1)(B) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 1261(f)(2)(2000). 
 81. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 94, § 307B (2006).  The only other states to 
require cigarette manufacturers to disclose information about their products are 
Minnesota and Texas, but these disclosure laws have been criticized as being 
inadequate. See Davidson, supra note 63, at 17–28. 
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disclosure law required submission of an annual report 
identifying “any added constituent other than tobacco, water or 
reconstituted tobacco sheet made wholly from tobacco, to be 
listed in descending order according to weight, measure or 
numerical count” for each brand of cigarette, snuff, or chewing 
tobacco sold in Massachusetts.82  The law was intended to 
provide the Massachusetts Department of Public Health with 
information to aid in studying the health effects of each brand of 
cigarette. 
The leading cigarette manufacturers brought a suit 
challenging the disclosure law and deftly pitted the value of 
trade secrets against the importance of protecting the public’s 
health.83  The court faulted Massachusetts for failing to “identify 
any background principles of state law that successfully obviate 
[the manufacturers’] property interest in their trade secrets,”84 
but ignored the bedrock principle that the state’s “police power” 
includes the power and responsibility of protecting the public’s 
health.85  The court concluded that the trade secret was a 
property interest deserving protection under a regulatory 
takings analysis86 and that the Massachusetts law amounted to 
an unconstitutional taking without just compensation.87 
The immunity from regulatory oversight undoubtedly stems 
from the vast financial resources of the cigarette manufacturers 
that have earned them an unparalleled influence on the political 
process.88  Yet, even more important than the question of how 
 82. See § 307B of the Massachusetts General Laws. 
 83. See Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 26 (2002). 
 84. Id. at 33. 
 85. See James G. Hodge, Jr., Implementing Modern Public Health Goals 
Through Government: An Examination of New Federalism and Public Health 
Law, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93, 94 (1997). 
 86. See Philip Morris, 312 F.3d at 45–47. 
 87. See id. 
 88. Former FDA Commission David Kessler recalls that those in the agency 
opposed to regulation argued that tobacco was just too powerful to bait.  See 
DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A 
DEADLY INDUSTRY 34-35 (2001).  Since 1997, the year after the FDA asserted 
its authority to regulate tobacco, “tobacco interests have given more than $30.9 
million in political donations to federal candidates, national parties and non-
party political action committees.”  See TOBACCO FREE KIDS ACTION FUND & 
COMMON CAUSE, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS BY TOBACCO INTERESTS ANNUAL 
REPORT: SEPTEMBER 2005 1 (2005), available at 
http://tobaccofreeaction.org/contributions/september2005/september2005.pdf.  
In 2004, the tobacco industry spent an additional $23 million on lobbyists, or 
$173,000 each day that Congress was in session that year.  Id. at 2.  The threat 
of legal challenges in the courts adds to the difficulty of shepherding tobacco 
control bills through the legislative process, particularly at the state level.  See 
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the tobacco industry has escaped product regulation is the 
impact of the lack of tobacco regulation.  With the nature of its 
products hidden from scrutiny, the tobacco industry has 
engineered and implemented design changes with devastating 
effects on the public’s health.  Chief among such changes was 
the radical increase in the addictiveness of cigarettes.  In 1972, 
Philip Morris researcher William Dunn famously recommended, 
“[t]he cigarette should be conceived not as a product but as a 
package.  The product is nicotine . . . [t]hink of the cigarette pack 
as a storage container for a day’s supply of nicotine.  Think of 
the cigarette as a dispenser for a unit dose of nicotine.”89  
Adopting this perspective, the cigarette manufacturers 
transformed the cigarette from shredded tobacco leaf rolled in 
paper into a delivery device for nicotine.90 
Nicotine mimics a neurotransmitter in the body and triggers 
the release of artificially high levels of various hormones that 
alter the smoker’s mood and mental performance.91  Over time, 
once brain cells adapt to the regular presence of nicotine and the 
brain can function at normal levels in its presence, the smoker 
develops a tolerance and becomes dependent on nicotine in order 
to function normally and escape withdrawal symptoms.92  By 
raising the pH of cigarette smoke through the addition of 
ammonia compounds and manipulating smoke particulate size 
to achieve the fastest possible absorption deep in the lungs, 
tobacco manufacturers have enhanced this effect.93  These and 
other changes maximized the rate and amount of the delivery 
and absorption of nicotine but did so at the expense of the 
public’s health.94  The increase in delivery and absorption of 
Wendy Parmet & Christopher Banthin, Public Health Protection and the 
Commerce Clause: Controlling Tobacco in the Internet Age, 35 N.M. L. REV. 81, 
83 (2005). 
 89. See WILLIAM L. DUNN, MOTIVES AND INCENTIVES IN CIGARETTE 
SMOKING 4 (n.d.), available at 
http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/2024273959-3975.html (last visited Jan. 
26, 2007). 
 90. See PETER BOYLE ET AL., TOBACCO SCIENCE, POLICY AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH, chs. 6–9 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004); see also United States v. Philip 
Morris USA, Inc., No. 99-2496(GK), 2006 WL 2380648 at * 47 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 
2006) (stating “Defendants Have Falsely Denied That They Can and Do Control 
the Level of Nicotine Delivered In Order to Create and Sustain Addiction”). 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. 
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nicotine was accompanied by an increase in exposure to 
carcinogenic smoke constituents.95  Increases in addictiveness 
also triggered an increase in the average number of cigarettes 
smoked per day by each smoker, as well as an increase in the 
percentage of the population that smoked.96 
Another example of industry conduct in the absence of 
product oversight is the advent of “light” cigarette brands.  By 
the late 1960s, scientific studies showed that tar and nicotine 
correlated with a significantly increased risk of developing 
numerous diseases, particularly lung cancer.97  Cigarette 
manufacturers viewed these findings as a threat to their 
profitability98 and responded by marketing and selling “light” 
cigarettes.  Manufacturers also developed an industry testing 
protocol for nicotine and tar levels.99  They called it the “FTC 
method”—though the Federal Trade Commission neither 
mandated nor approved the testing method—and cigarette 
makers prominently posted the test results on their packaging 
and advertising for each brand.100  “Light” cigarette brands 
displayed relatively low tar and nicotine measurements based on 
this method.101 
However, while touted by manufacturers for lower tar and 
nicotine levels, “light” cigarette brands actually exposed smokers 
to nearly the same amounts of tar and nicotine as other cigarette 
brands.102  The “FTC method” failed (and continues to fail) to 
account for the effect that a cigarette brand’s design has on 
smoking behavior.  After each puff of smoke, the brain registers 
how much nicotine it received and unconsciously increases or 
decreases the effort expended to get the amount of nicotine that 
the brain desires from the next puff.103  Cigarette manufacturers 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See R. W. Pollay & R. Dewhirst, The Dark Side of Marketing Seemingly 
“Light” Cigarettes: Successful Images and Failed Fact, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL 
i18, i18 (2002). 
 98. See id. 
 99. See Lynn T. Kozlowski et al., Cigarette Design, in SMOKING AND 
TOBACCO CONTROL MONOGRAPH 13: RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SMOKING 
CIGARETTES WITH LOW MACHINE-MEASURED YIELDS OF TAR AND NICOTINE 13 
(2001). 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. at 18–32. 
 103. See Neal L. Benowitz, Compensatory Smoking of Low-Yield Cigarettes, 
in SMOKING AND TOBACCO CONTROL MONOGRAPH 13: RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH 
SMOKING CIGARETTES WITH LOW MACHINE-MEASURED YIELDS OF TAR AND 
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knew that smokers of “light” cigarettes would take in much more 
tar and nicotine than smokers were led to believe.104  Some 
manufacturers even placed vents near the filters that were 
designed to add fresh air to smoke during testing, but that were 
covered by the smoker’s fingers when smoked under normal 
conditions.105 
The impact of “light” cigarettes on the public’s health is 
enormous.  The “light” cigarette and other similar innovations 
touted by cigarette manufacturers as health improvements have 
not reduced the health risk associated with smoking.106  Yet, 
people continue to believe that “light” cigarettes are less risky 
than other cigarette brands; a misperception that is at least 
partly attributable to the hundreds of millions of marketing 
dollars spent promoting “light” cigarettes.107 
IV. THE “VERMONT LAWSUIT” 
The Vermont Attorney General’s lawsuit against R.J. 
Reynolds is the result of a coordinated effort among several 
states, including active support by California, Connecticut, the 
District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, New York, 
and Tennessee.108  The Vermont lawsuit is being brought under 
the 1998 Multi-state Master Settlement Agreement (MSA).109  
The MSA settled lawsuits brought by the states to recover 
NICOTINE 41 (Donald R. Shopland ed., 2001). 
 104. See Richard W. Pollay & Timothy Dewhirst, Marketing Cigarettes with 
Low Machine-Measured Yields, in SMOKING AND TOBACCO CONTROL 
MONOGRAPH 13: RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SMOKING CIGARETTES WITH LOW 
MACHINE-MEASURED YIELDS OF TAR AND NICOTINE 230-31 (Donald R. Shopland 
ed. 2001). 
 105. See L. T. Kozlowski & R. J. O’Connor, Cigarette Filter Ventilation Is a 
Defective Design Because of Misleading Taste, Bigger Puffs, and Blocked Vents, 
11 TOBACCO CONTROL i40, i40 (2002). 
 106. See Michael J. Thun & David M. Burns, Health Impact of “Reduced 
Yield” Cigarettes: A Critical Assessment of the Epidemiological Evidence, 10 
TOBACCO CONTROL i4, i9 (2002). 
 107. See Lynn T. Kozlowski & Janine L. Pillitteri, Beliefs about “Light” and 
“Ultra Light” Cigarettes and Efforts to Change Those Beliefs: An Overview of 
Early Efforts and Published Research, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL il2, il2 (2001).  See 
generally Saul Shiffman et al., Smokers’ Belief about “Light” and “Ultra Light” 
Cigarettes, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL il7 (2001); Saul Shiffman et al., Effect of 
Health Messages about “Light” and “Ultra Light” Cigarettes on Beliefs and 
Quitting Intent, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL i24 (2001). 
 108. See Press Release, Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell, supra 
note 1. 
 109. See Petition for Contempt & Complaint, supra note 6.  The lawsuit also 
alleges violation of Vermont’s Unlawful and Unfair Practices Law.  Id. 
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smoking-related Medicaid and other public healthcare costs 
caused by the cigarette manufacturers’ wrongdoing.110  In these 
cases, states alleged that smoking rates, and consequently the 
Medicaid and related expenditures they incurred in treating sick 
and dying smokers, would have been much lower if cigarette 
manufacturers had been honest with the public about the 
dangers caused by smoking and not committed other wrongful 
acts orchestrated to keep smoking rates as high as possible.111  
The lawsuits successfully forced the manufacturers to shoulder 
at least some of these medical costs.112 
The MSA also established some marketing restrictions.  The 
National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) supervises 
state enforcement of the MSA.113  NAAG established the 
Tobacco Enforcement Committee, which is composed of several 
attorneys who coordinate and oversee industry compliance and 
the Enforcement Working Group, which primarily assists and 
advises the Enforcement Committee.114  The Tobacco Project, 
also established by NAAG, coordinates and supports 
enforcement efforts and serves as a clearinghouse of 
information.115  The marketing restrictions and ongoing 
enforcement efforts have led to some important changes in 
tobacco marketing and have kept tobacco-related issues on the 
radar screens of state officials charged with regulating 
advertising in magazines, free samples, advertising at sporting 
events, and other promotional activities.  All of the domestic 
cigarette manufacturers have been implicated in at least one 
enforcement action; R.J. Reynolds has been responsible for a 
disproportionately large share.116 
The Vermont lawsuit alleges that R.J. Reynolds’ advertising 
for Eclipse cigarettes violates section III(r) of the MSA, which 
prohibits cigarette manufacturers from making “any material 
 110. See Michele Bloch, Richard Daynard & Ruth Roemer, A Year of Living 
Dangerously: The Tobacco Control Community Meets the Global Settlement, 113 
PUB. HEALTH REPS. 488, 490–91 (1998). 
 111. See id. at 490. 
 112. See Richard A. Daynard et al., Commentary, Implications for Tobacco 
Control of the Multistate Tobacco Settlement, 91 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1967, 
1968 (2001). 
 113. See DENNIS ECKHART, TOBACCO CONTROL LEAGUE CONSORTIUM, THE 
TOBACCO MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: ENFORCEMENT OF MARKETING 
RESTRICTIONS 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.wmitchell.edu/tobaccolaw/resources/eckhart.pdf. 
 114. See id. at 3. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. 
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misrepresentation of fact regarding the health consequences of 
using any tobacco product, including any tobacco additives, 
filters, paper or other ingredients.”117  The complaint filed by the 
state of Vermont identifies several alleged misrepresentations 
made by R.J. Reynolds in Eclipse cigarette advertising: 
Discover the difference. A cigarette that may present less risk of 
cancer, bronchitis, and possibly emphysema. 
A cigarette that responds to concerns about certain smoking-related 
illnesses.  Including cancer. 
A better way to smoke.  The best choice for smokers who worry about 
their health is to quit.  Eclipse is the next best choice. 
Extensive scientific studies show that compared to other cigarettes: 
Eclipse may present less risk of cancer, and Eclipse produces less 
inflammation in the respiratory system, which suggests lower risk of 
chronic bronchitis and possibly even emphysema. 
Because Eclipse primarily heats rather than burns tobacco, its smoke 
chemistry is fundamentally different, and the toxicity of its smoke is 
dramatically reduced compared to other cigarettes. For example, 
studies with smokers who switched to Eclipse from their usual brand 
show that Eclipse produced: 
- 17-57% less lung inflammation (after two months in smokers of 2 
packs or more/day) 
- 70% lower smoking-related mutagenicity (DNA changes). 
Because [Eclipse] primarily heats tobacco rather than burning it, 
testing shows that the smoke is very different from that of other 
cigarettes. The results of many of these tests have, in fact, been 
presented at scientific meetings or published in scientific journals. 
Extensive analysis of Eclipse shows that [it] contains far less of many 
of the compounds that have been linked to the risk of cancer and 
associated with certain other smoking-related illnesses.118 
The complaint alleges that these claims are no more than 
unproven marketing ploys meant to exploit smokers’ health 
concerns.119 R.J. Reynolds is accused of lacking any “competent 
and reliable scientific evidence to substantiate such 
representations.”120 
The exact form and breadth of the injunctive relief sought 
by the Vermont Attorney General will become apparent as 
litigation proceeds.  Currently, the complaint asks that R.J 
Reynolds be prohibited from representing in any fashion that its 
products reduce the risk of disease, that its products are safer 
 117. See Petition for Contempt & Complaint, supra note 6, at 1. 
 118. Id. at 3–5. 
 119. See id. at 4–5. 
 120. Id. at 5. 
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than other cigarettes or provide a safe alternative to quitting, or 
that the smoke is safer, without first possessing “competent and 
reliable scientific information.”121  The court may look favorably 
upon a request by the Vermont Attorney General for detailed 
research and surveillance protocols to be put in place.  Courts 
are reluctant to limit the application of state Unfair and 
Deceptive Practices laws, upon which the MSA is premised, 
preferring instead to preserve flexibility to address unforeseen 
or complex abusive business schemes. 122 
Nevertheless, enforcement under the MSA, even when 
diligently pursued, may be inadequate to prevent PREPs from 
posing a public-health risk.  As an initial matter, the MSA fails 
to require the disclosure of information for determining the 
health effects of product design and ingredients.123  A 
manufacturer may secretly alter the addictiveness of cigarettes, 
use even deadlier toxic ingredients to create new cigarette 
flavors, or make other changes that make smoking even more 
dangerous, in perfect secrecy.  Just as a consumer cannot 
compare prices without being allowed to check price tags, policy 
makers cannot develop a meaningful harm reduction policy 
without having reasonable access to information about the 
current level of harm. 
Within the context of marketing oversight, an area which 
the MSA purports to provide oversight, there are also reasons 
for concern.  For the Eclipse-type advertising identified in the 
Vermont lawsuit, the MSA provides an effective form of 
oversight.  R.J. Reynolds appears to have recommended 
switching to Eclipse cigarettes for specific health-related reasons 
without determining whether Eclipse provides any advantages 
over traditional cigarettes in the face of contradictory research 
by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health.  However, 
in the future, state attorneys general are likely to confront more 
subtle health claims than those used to promote Eclipse 
cigarettes.  Such advertisement might take the form of a 
discussion of how some new technology works and how it affects 
smoke chemistry, and do so without saying anything explicit 
about decreasing risks associated with smoking.  The 
manufacturers could even post a disclaimer on the packaging or 
 121. See id. 
 122. See JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, UNFAIR AND 
DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES §1.1 (6th ed. 2004). 
 123. NAT’L  ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
(n.d.), available at http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-
pdf/1109185724_1032468605_cigmsa.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2007). 
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product website, such as the following: “[c]urrent technology is 
insufficient to determine whether Move cigarettes are actually 
less harmful.  Therefore, you should not assume there is any 
health benefit in switching to Move.  Quitting is always the best 
option for your health.” 
This type of advertising can be misleading to smokers 
struggling with addiction-induced dissociation.124  Addiction to 
nicotine can cause smokers to grasp whatever evidence or 
suggestion rationalizes continued smoking, while at the same 
time dissociating themselves from health recommendations or 
warnings.125 
Responding to the misleading effects of these subtle types of 
advertising under authority granted by the MSA would involve 
substantial resources and time.  Unlike rulings by 
administrative agencies to which courts afford substantial 
discretion,126 MSA enforcement involves meeting the high 
evidentiary standards imposed by courts in the litigation 
process.  The case-by-case approach of evaluating abuses like the 
hypothetical Move cigarette advertisement could quickly 
overwhelm the limited budgets of enforcement officials.  
Moreover, after an issue has been litigated, the manufacturer 
need only make slight wording changes to start the entire 
process over again. 
Another potentially abusive practice related to PREPs 
involves the targeting of individuals who might quit or never 
start smoking if they were not otherwise persuaded to use a 
“less harmful” type of cigarette.  States invest hundreds of 
millions of dollars into cessation programs via Medicaid 
coverage of cessation aids.127  A manufacturer could easily 
target its PREP advertising at current and future recipients of 
these cessation services in an effort to reduce quit rates and 
keep that demographic smoking.  In fact, in a survey designed to 
determine the impact of Eclipse marketing, respondents who 
 124. See Richard D. Hurt & Channing R. Robertson, Prying Open the Door to 
the Tobacco Industry’s Secrets about Nicotine: The Minnesota Tobacco Trial, 280 
JAMA 1173, 1174 (1998). 
 125. See id. 
 126. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984). 
 127. See ERIC LINDBLOM, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, A BROKEN 
PROMISE TO OUR CHILDREN: THE 1998 STATE TOBACCO SETTLEMENT SEVEN 
YEARS LATER i-iv (2005), available at 
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/reports/settlements/2006/fullreport.pdf. 
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were contemplating quitting demonstrated the greatest interest 
in trying Eclipse cigarettes and after exposure to Eclipse 
advertising, showed a reduced interest in quitting.128  The MSA 
says nothing about targeting smokers who would otherwise quit. 
The most troubling aspect of relying solely on the MSA for 
oversight of PREPs is that tobacco manufacturers can establish 
harm-reduction policies without actually having to meet any 
predetermined goals.  Manufacturers decide the extent to which 
their cigarette brands incorporate PREP technology.  
Manufacturers can even define what constitutes a “less harmful” 
cigarette by focusing on reducing certain carcinogens, but not 
other harmful aspects of smoking.  For example, R.J. Reynolds 
admits that Eclipse cigarettes do nothing to reduce the risk from 
cardiovascular disease, which causes 50% of smoking-related 
deaths.129  Also, manufacturers largely ignore the addictiveness 
of cigarettes, as well as the carcinogenic properties of nicotine.130  
It would even be possible for manufacturers to increase the 
lethality or addictiveness of traditional cigarettes just to make 
PREPs appear less harmful or addictive.131  There is ultimately 
little reason—apart from the threat of regulatory oversight or 
other liability—to believe manufacturers would want to reduce 
emissions in a manner that might compromise aroma, taste, 
addictiveness and sales. 
Even if one assumes that market forces could force 
manufacturers to produce a substantially less-risky cigarette in 
the absence of mandated performance standards,132 the harm 
 128. See Saul Shiffman et al., Smoker and Ex-Smoker Reactions to Cigarettes 
Claiming Reduced Risk, 13 TOBACCO CONTROL 78, 78 (2004). 
 129. See Joan Stephenson, A “Safer” Cigarette? Prove It, Says Critics, 283 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 2507, 2508 (2000). 
 130. See Jack Henningfield et al., Reducing Tobacco Addiction Through 
Tobacco Product Regulation, 13 TOBACCO CONTROL 132, 132 (2004). 
 131. See, e.g., Gregory N. Connolly, et al., Harvard School of Public Health,  
Trends in Smoke Nicotine Yield and Relationship to Design Characteristics 
Among Popular U.S. Cigarette Brands, 1997-2005 (2007), available at 
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/nicotine/trends.pdf. 
 132. Smokers and potential smokers generally rely on manufacturers for 
information about cigarettes.  See Michael Cummings et al., Are Smokers 
Adequately Informed about the Health Risks of Smoking and Medicinal 
Nicotine?, 6 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 333, 339 (2004).  The perception of risk 
by individuals can be shaped mostly by a manufacturers’ advertising, perhaps 
because most people mistakenly believe that a government agency has approved 
such claims.  See William Hamilton et al., Smokers’ Responses to Advertisements 
for Regular and Light Cigarettes and Potentially Reduced-Exposure Tobacco 
Products, 6 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 353, 360 (2004).  Or, manufacturers’ 
promotional efforts simply drown out countervailing views.  See FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, CIGARETTE REPORT FOR 2002 1 (2004), available at 
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caused by tobacco might actually increase in the aggregate.  
Critics of the use of harm reduction policies, as contrasted with 
the use of harm elimination policies, argue that it sends the 
wrong message and can perpetuate or even increase the risky 
behavior in question.133  In the case of tobacco, such as light 
cigarette brands, PREPs could attract smokers and potential 
smokers who might otherwise quit or never start smoking.  
Although the harm to individual smokers may be lower, the 
reduction may be accompanied by an increase in smoking rates, 
which could lead to an aggregate increase in harm because more 
people would be smoking.134  Without the protections afforded by 
evidenced-based performance standards, universal application of 
these standards, and monitoring to counterbalance aggregate 
increases in smoking and disease rates, the introduction of 
PREP cigarettes could end up doing more harm than good. 
V.  LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
A responsive policy capable of addressing concerns raised by 
PREP cigarettes could be established by states.  The protection 
and regulation of public health has traditionally been considered 
a core part of inherent state police powers.135  This role is 
illustrated by the aggressive stance many states have adopted 
regarding tobacco control and prevention.  For example, states 
have banned smoking in public places, taxed tobacco products, 
established youth access laws, and have created cessation 
programs.136 
Having an accurate listing of brand-specific constituent 
yields would save time and expense for states attorneys general 
who are monitoring PREP cigarette advertising under the MSA 
and for public health scientists who are trying to create disease 
prediction models.  Additionally, with comprehensive disclosure 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/cigarette/041022cigaretterpt.pdf . 
 133. See Amy Fairchild & James Colgrove, Out of the Ashes: The Life, Death, 
and Rebirth of the “Safer” Cigarette in the United States, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
192, 192 (2004). 
 134. See id. 
 135. See Hodge, supra note 85. 
 136. See generally Dileep. G. Bal et al., The California Tobacco Control 
Program, in TOBACCO AND HEALTH 341–45 (Karen Slama ed., 1995) (noting the 
role of legislation regarding public smoking bans and media campaigns in 
promulgating an anti-smoking message in California); see also Parmet & 
Banthin, supra note 88, at 88-90 (discussing states’ use of tobacco taxes to 
dissuade smoking). 
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also comes the ability to mandate the manner in which 
constituent yields are measured and the requirement that 
manufacturers to take a documented stance on each of its 
brands.  Misleading advertisements and marketing would 
become harder to sustain, and thus less likely to occur, in the 
face of ongoing verification by regulators.137 
A model for the establishment of harm reduction goals at 
the state level can be found in the successful implementation of 
reduced ignition propensity laws.  Such laws are aimed at 
reducing fires caused by unattended cigarettes, which is one of 
the leading causes of fires in homes.138  Connolly and colleagues 
examined the implementation of New York’s reduced ignition 
propensity law and found that manufacturers were able to meet 
performance goals, which in turn, led to a dramatic reduction in 
ignition propensity of cigarettes compared to traditional 
brands.139  Similar laws have been passed in Vermont, 
California, and Canada.140 
Of course the FDA could establish a responsive policy.  
Indeed, legislation has been filed for the reauthorization of FDA 
jurisdiction over tobacco products.  In May 2004, Senators Mike 
DeWine and Edward Kennedy introduced Senate Bill 2461 to 
provide the FDA with oversight over tobacco products and 
marketing.141  The FDA reauthorization legislation would 
require manufacturers to obtain approval before marketing a 
PREP cigarette.142  The application process would require the 
submission of product and marketing information in a process 
that is largely open for public comment, including annual post-
market surveillances, and must be renewed every five years.143  
The FDA would approve applications only if the applicant 
demonstrated that the actual manner in which consumers use 
 137. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L. J. 785, 812 (2001). 
 138. JOHN R. HALL, JR., NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, THE 
SMOKING-MATERIAL FIRE PROBLEM 10 (2006). 
 139. See G. N. Connolly et al., Effects of the New York State Cigarette Fire 
Safety Standard on Ignition Propensity, Smoke Constituents, and the Consumer 
Market, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 321, 321-27 (2005). 
 140. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2757 (2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
14952 (2006); Cigarette Ignition Propensity Regulations (Tobacco) Act 
SOR/2005-178, 139 C. Gaz. 1505 (2005). 
 141. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, S. 2461, 108th 
Cong. (2004) (“To protect the public health by providing the Food and Drug 
Administration with certain authority to regulate tobacco products.”). 
 142. See id. at § 911. 
 143. See id. 
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the product “significantly reduce[s] harm and the risk of tobacco-
related disease to individual tobacco users” and “benefit[s] the 
health of the population as a whole taking into account both 
users of tobacco products and persons who do not currently use 
tobacco products.”144  Importantly, the FDA would also have 
authority to set performance standards for reductions in 
carcinogenic emissions and nicotine, and to limit marketing for 
PREP cigarettes based on their aggregate effects on smoking 
rates.145 
Cigarette manufacturers know that they can shape smokers’ 
perceptions of risk, perhaps because most people mistakenly 
believe that a government agency has approved such claims,146 
or perhaps because cigarette manufacturers’ promotional 
budgets simply drown out countervailing views.147  In its lawsuit 
against R.J. Reynolds, Vermont attempted to draw a line in the 
sand that PREP cigarettes shall not be marketed in a manner 
that caused smokers to overestimate the actual harm reduction 
value of these products.  And in the absence of scientific proof, 
there is not actual harm reduction value. 
With the introduction of PREP cigarettes in the absence of 
ingredient disclosure requirements, an investigation by an FDA-
like review or other typical oversight of health claims, the 
public’s health is once again at risk as a result of tobacco.  
According to Judge Gladys Kessler who for seven years presided 
over the Federal Governments Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations case, the Defendants’ misled smokers 
and potential smokers into believing that light cigarettes were 
less harmful to keep them smoking.148 Today, decades after the 
initial introduction of light cigarettes, the Defendants’ continue 
to misled smokers and potential smokers into believing that 
light cigarettes are safer than other cigarette brands, according 
to Judge Kessler.149 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See Hamilton et al., supra note 132. 
 147. See FED. TRADE. COMM’N, supra note 132. 
 148. See U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 99-2496 (GK) 2006 WL 2380648 
to 2006 WL 23089681, at *177–78 (D. D.C. Aug. 17, 2006). 
 149. See id. at *204–06. 
